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RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATIO-FORBEARANCE

TO

SuE.

Defendant widow

married the plaintiffs' father two months prior to his death, and his
insurance policies were made over to her immediately after the marriage.
In compromise of threatened action to have the marriage declared void
and to have the change of beneficiary invalidated, the widow consented
to take one-third of the proceeds of the insurance and one-third of the
estate of the decedent. Defendant now claims the compromise agreement
lacked consideration, and the children seek specific performance of the
compromise. Held: There was an enforceable agreement since the plaintiffs had relinquished claims which were "at least doubtful". Jones v.
Reese, 191 Wash. 16, 70 P. (2d) 811 (1937).
The cases on the question of relinquishment of claims as consideration
for a promise have been classified by one authority into two groups:
(1) "Those which make the test the honesty of the claimant, provided
the invalidity of the claim, in law or fact, is not perfectly obvious," and
(2) those "which lay down the older rule, without qualification, that the
claim forborne must 'be reasonably doubtful in fact or law." I WmirSTo
ON1 CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 135. Under both views good faith is
required, the difference being in whether the emphasis is placed upon
the subjective honesty of the claimant, or upon the reasonableness of the
doubtful claim, viewed objectively. As the above writer has said, (§ 135)
"Even in those states whose courts lay the principal stress on the honesty
and good faith of the claimant, forbearance is insufficient consideration
if the claim forborne is so lacking in foundation as to make its assertion
incompatible with both honesty and a reasonable degree of intelligence."
Where the stress is placed on "reasonable doubtfulness", the claim is
viewed objectively. If, to a person of reasonable intelligence, the claim
would appear to be groundless, good faith will not be found.
The previous Washington cases on this point have made the test the
"reasonable doubtfulness" of the claim asserted. Sanford v. Royal Ins. Co.,
11 Wash. 653, 40 Pac. 609 (1895); Nicholson v. Neary, 77 Wash. 294, 137
Pac. 492 (1914); Cunningham v. Wilk, 150 Wash. 512, 273 Pac. 527 (1929);
Gainsburgv. Garbarsky, 157 Wash. 537, 289 Pac. 1000 (1930). In the first
three of these cases the honesty of the one asserting the claim was doubtful, and the court might have reached the same result under the "honesty" test. In the Gainsburg case, if the claimant was honest, the claim
was so obviously groundless that the same result could have been reached
under the qualification to the "honesty" test that the claim was "so
lacking In foundation as to make its assertion incompatible with honesty
and a reasonable degree of intelligence."
In the Instant case the court again lays down the rule of the Nicholson
case, supra, pointing out that there were valid grounds upon which the
claimants might have contested the widow's claims in that the beneficiary
of an insurance policy may attack the validity of the change in beneficiary on the ground -that it is not the act of the insured; or they might
have sought a decree adjudging that the purported marriage was in fact
no marriage at all. The conclusion is that "it cannot be -held that the
appellants' claims were not at least doubtful." The court also discusses
the honesty of the claimants under the "family settlement" doctrine,
concluding that "the claimants, or at least some of them, were honestly
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of the opinion that they could maintain an action which would probably
result in their recovery of a greater amount . . . of their father's estate
than they would receive if no such claim were asserted." In none of
the cases has the court decided that an agreement is without consideration if the relinquished claim was asserted in good faith, and was not
obviously invalid. When a case presenting such a set of facts arises,
qnaere: will the Washington court approve the "honesty" test?
D. W. G.
ESCROw AGREEMENTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS. P, grantor, seeks specific
performance of a contract to sell and purchase real property. Deed and
check in payment therefor 'were both deposited in escrow to be delivered
respectively to D, grantee, and P upon performance of a condition by P.
The escrow agreement was not in writing. D had written several letters
to P containing the material facts of the agreement. Held: These letters
constituted a sufficient memorandum to bar the operation of the Statute
of Frauds, and there was a valid escrow. No consideration was given
to the fact that the condition was to be performed by the grantor. There
was a dictcmv to the effect that "an agreement to deposit an instrument
in escrow may be made orally" citing as authority 10 R.C.L. 623 and 21
C.J. 868. Conner v. Helvik, 73 P. (2d) 541 (Mont. 1937).
It is submitted that the dictnm referred to does not follow the great
weight of authority. The authorities cited by the court refer to the conditions of the escrow and not to the escrow agreement itself. 10 R. C. L.
622, § 3; cf. 10 R. C. L. 623-4, § 5; also cf. 21 C. J. at 866, § 2, and 21
C.J. 868, § 7. It is generally held that where there exists a previous
valid contract to convey, the conditions upon which the deed is deposited
may rest in and be proved by parol. See Nichols v. Opperman, 6 Wash.
618, 34 Pac. 162 (1893); Campbell v. Thomas, 42 Wis. 437, 24 Am.Rep.
427 (1877); Minnesota etc. Land Co. v. Hewitt Inv. Co., 201 Fed. 752
(1913). But it is submitted that an enforcible escrow for the sale or
exchange of real property should depend wholly for its validity upon
an agreement in writing or some sufficient memorandum to avoid the
Statute of Frauds (part performance aside). McLain v. Healy, 98 Wash.
489, 168 Pac. 1, L. R. A. 1918A 1161; Foulkes v. Sengstacken, 83 Ore. 118,
163 Pac. 311 (1917); Collins v. Kares, 52 S. D. 143, 216 N. W. 880 (1928);
Main v. Pratt, 276 Ill.218, 114 N. E. 576 (1916); Blue v. Conner (Texas
Civ. App. 1918), 219 S. W. 533 (1918); Anderson v. Messenger, 158 Fed.
250 (1907); Masters v. Clark, 89 Ark. 191, 116 S. W. 186 (1909). Contra:
Macy v. Mielenz, 27 N. M. 261, 199 Pac. 1011 (1921). See R. W. Aigler,
Is a Contract Necessary to Create an Effective Escrow? (1918) 16 MicH.
L. REV. 567, contending that a written contract is not necessary. See
to the same effect Professor Tjffany (1914) 14 COL. L. REv. 399.
To constitute an escrow satisfying the above principle there must be
more than mere written instructions. There must be a writing executed
by both parties or by the party to be charged, see Palm-er v. Stanwood
Land Co., 158 Wash. 487, 291 Pac. 342 (1930).
As to what constitutes a sufficient written memorandum to prove the
escrow agreement, greater confusion exists. A note in 100 A. L. R. 210
takes the position that if a deed containing substantially the provisions
of an oral contract of sale of land is delivered in escrow so that it has
passed into the possession of a stranger for delivery to the grantee upon
the happening of some event or the performance of some condition and
is beyond the control of the grantor, the contract is taken out of the
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Statute of Frauds. Tharadsom v. Everts, 87 Minn. 168, 91 N. W. 467
(1902); Cannon v. Handley, 72 Gal. 138, 13 Pae. 315 (1887); Minnesota
Co., 201 Fed. 752 (1913).
0. Land Co. v. Hewitt Iv.
There is no case directly in point in Washington. However, it would
seem that if a deed does contain the terms of the contract, the Washington court would recognize this rule. McLain v. Healy, 98 Wash. 489,
168 Pac. 1, L. R. A. 1918A 1161; In re Edwall, 75 Wash. 391, 134 Pac. 1041
(1913); cf. note 100 A. L. R. 216.
The Washington Supreme Court has -held, as did the Montana court
in the instant case, that letters containing the essential terms of a
contract to sell land can constitute a sufficient memorandum of an escrow
agreement to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. .Bronx 11m. Co. v. Nat'l Bank
of Coimerce, 47 Wash. 566, 92 Pac. 380 (1907).
W. J. W.
EVIDENCE - PRIVILEGED (COniunCATION'S- PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT.
Plaintiff sought specific performance of an oral contract to make a will.
By the terms of the alleged contract, plaintiff was to care for the deceased
as long as he should live, in consideration for decedent's promise to
devise and bequeath to the plaintiff all his property. To prove this
contract, plaintiff called as a witness the physician who had attended
decedent, who testified -that on two occasions the decedent -had told him
of the arrangements with the plaintiff, one time specifically detailing the
agreement. The physician admitted that these statements were elicited
from decedent in the course of prescribing for him, and in response to a
suggestion that decedent go to a hospital where he could receive proper
care. Held: The testimony of the physician was a privileged communication within REm. REV. STAT. § 1214, the information acquired being
necessary to enable the physician to prescribe or act for the patient.
Judgment was granted the plaintiff, however, on proof of the contract by
the testimony of another witness. Resor P. Schaefer, 93 Wash. Dec. 95,
74 P. (2d) 917 (1938).
At common law this privilege did not exist. 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (2d
ed. 1923) § 2380. It is of statutory origin, and in some jurisdictions is
limited In its application to civil cases. People v. Griffith, 146 Cal. 339,
80 Pac. 68 (1905). The Washington statute, REM. RzV. STAT. § 1214-4,
provides: "A regular physician or surgeon shall not, without the consent
of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information
acquired in attending such patient, which was necessary to enable him
to prescribe or act for the patient." The statute has been applied to
criminal actions under REM. REV. STAT. § 2152, providing that the rules
of evidence in civil actions shall be, so far as practicable, applied in
criminal prosecutions. State v. Miller, 105 Wash. 475, 178 Pac. 459 (1919).
The privilege exists In about one-half of -theUnited States, and nearly
all statutes, either expressly or by judicial construction, require that the
communication, to be privileged, must be necessary to enable the physician to treat the patient. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2380 et seq.
There has been a sharp diversity of opinion as to what is deemed
"necessary" within the wording of the statute. Since -this statute is in
derogation of the common law, it would seem naturally to follow that it
should be strictly construed, yet the majority of states, including Washington, give it a liberal construction. See State v. Miller, supra. It has
been held that statements by the patient to -thephysician as to the details
of the accident in which the injury was sustained were not privileged.
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Green v. Terminal By. Ass'n etc., 211 Mo. 18, 109 S. W. 715 (1908);
Grossnickle v. Avery, 85 Ind. App. 443, 152 N. E. 288 (1926). A physician
can testify that a -patient, being treated for an accident, was intoxicated,
since this is not necessary to treatment for the injury. State v. Townsend,
146 Kan. 982, 73 P. (2d) 1124 (1937). But a few states have held everything divulged to a physician while the physician-patient relation exists
is privileged. McRae v. Erickson, 1 Cal. App. 326, 82 Pac. 209 (1905);
Battis v. Ry. Co., 124 Iowa 623, 100 N. W. 543 (1904); Brayman v. Russell
4 Pugh Lumber Co., 31 Ida. 140, 169 Pac. 932 (1917). Indiana has gone
to the extent of holding that "it is conclusively presumed that a physician
will ask a patient only as to matters necessary to treatment." Pennsylvania Co. v. Marion, 123 Ind. 415, 23 N. E. 973, 7 L. R. A. 687, 18 Am.
St. Rep. 330 (1890).
If the physician makes an examination for the purpose of prescribing
treatment, the results of such examination are privileged. Strafford v.
Northern Pacific By. Co., 95 Wash. 450, 164 Pac. 71 (1917); and it has
been held that it was immaterial whether the physician did in fact prescribe or treat the patient. Wesseler v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 90 Wash.
234, 155 Pac. 1063 (1916); but if the examination is made for the purpose
of having the physician testify at a trial, clearly no privilege exists.
Strafford.v. Northern Pacific By. Co., supra. Likewise if the examination
is made at the instance of the adverse party, and submitted to by the
patient, there is no privilege. State ex rel. Berge v. Superior Court, 154
Wash. 144, 281 Pac. 733 (1921); Osborn v. Seattle, 142 Wash. 25, 252 Pac.
164 (1927).
A further conflict exists as to whom shall be the judge of whether
the information communicated by a patient to his physician is necessary
for treatment. Some decisions hold it is a matter to be decided by the
trial court. In re Redfield, 116 Cal. 637, 48 Pac. 794 (1897); Booren v.
McWilliams, 26 N. D. 558, 145 N. W. 410, ANN. CAS. 1916A, 388 (1914).
A New York case held that the trial judge was the sole judge as to
whether the information was necessary for the professional treatment,
notwithstanding the physician's statement to the contrary. Griffiths v.
Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 171 N. Y. 106, 63 N. E. 808 (1902). Other
decisions holding the trial court to be the judge are Kaskovich v. Rodestock, 107 Neb. 116, 185 N. W. 343 (1914); Madsen v. Utah Light & Ry.
Co., 36 Utah 528, 105 Pac. 799 (1909); Green v. Terminal By. Ass'n Etc.,
supra. On the other hand, what is apparently a numerical minority of
decisions hold the physician to be the judge as to whether the information acquired was necessary for treatment. McRae v. Erickson, supra;
Redmond v. Industrial Ben. Ass'n, 150 N. Y. 167, 44 N. E. 769 (1896).
Washington, while never directly deciding this point, seems in accord
with the minority. In Johns v. Clark, 138 Wash. 288, 244 Pac. 729 (1926),
a physician had attended the patient, and later made an examination of
the patient for the purpose of testifying. The physician testified that he
could not separate the knowledge acquired from this examination from
that which he learned at the time he attended the patient. The court
held the evidence was properly excluded, emphasizing the testimony of
the physician as to his inability to disconnect what he learned on the
two occasions. It is suggested that the court should be the sole judge
of whether the information acquired was necessary for treatment. To
do otherwise would be to place the entire application of the statute in
this respect within the hands of the physician.
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The physician-patient privilege has been widely criticized by commentators and text-writers, practically from, the time of the first statute
in New York in 1828. 5 WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2380 et seq.;
m
s
1 GnEENLEAF, EVIDENCE (16th ed. 1899) § 247a; 5 JoNEs, ComNE
ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1926) § 2189. See also Purrington, An Abused Privi7ege (1906), 6 COL. L. REV. 375.
The basis for the -privilege has been said to be "to facilitate and make
safe full and confidential disclosure by patient to physician, of all facts,
circumstances, and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their
subsequent enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to
the end that the physician may form a correct opinion and be enabled
safely and efficaciously to treat his patient." In re Breundl's Will, 102
Wis. 45, 78 N. W. 169 (1899). This reason has been often quoted in
later decisions sustaining the privilege. But it is certainly doubtful if
people would be deterred from seeking medical help because of the possibility of disclosure in court. At least in England and in one-half of the
United States this has not been the result. Moreover, only rarely is a
fact communicated to a physician confidential in any real sense. Most
persons discuss their ailments and operations very freely. Their reticence
to discuss them more often than not comes to the fore only when in
court it Is to their interest to suppress the facts.
The social policy behind such a privilege seems greatly overshadowed
by the injustices which too often result from suppression of relevant
evidence. Any rule which shuts out the truth as this does should only
be recognized when considerations of policy very clearly require it.
A committee of the California Code Commission in A Tentative Draft
of a Partial Re-Codification of the California Law of Evidence, drafted
in 1937, recommends the complete abrogation of the physician-patient
privilege. The argument in support of such recommendation expresses
the view of the text-writers. As Professor Wigmore phrases it, "Certain
it is that the practical employment of the privilege has come to mean
little but the suppression of useful truth-truth which ought to have
been disclosed and would never have been suppressed for the sake of
any inherent repugnancy in the medical facts involved." 5 WiGMtORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2380, p. 209.
In the instant case, it is very plain that the absence of the privilege
would not have deterred the decedent from making full disclosure of the
facts here held "necessary for treatment", and it Is rare indeed when the
allowance of the privilege can be reasonably said to have advanced the
L. W. T.
cause of public health.
EXEMPTIONS-PRoCEEDS on AvAILs OF LIFE INsURANCE-INcoME DERIVED
FRom EXEMPT PROPERTY. Defendant was a beneficiary of life and accident
insurance policies amounting to $120,000. With part of this sum defendant purchased an annuity from an insurance company, and deposited
another sum with a -bank in trust to invest and pay the income to her.
Plaintiff, judgment creditor at the time the insurance money was received, garnisheed defendant and joined the bank and insurance company
as co-defendants. Defendant filed a claim of exemption alleging that the
properties in the hands of the garnishees were the "proceeds or avails"
of the policies and under REm. REV. STAT. § 7230-1 were exempt from
liability. Held: The property purchased solely with the insurance money,
together with the interest and dividends derived therefrom, are "proceeds or avails" of the insurance policies and are exempt. Northern
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Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Kneisley, 93 Wash. Dec. 338, 76 P. (2d) 297
(1938).
Although it is the general rule that exemption statutes are to be
liberally construed in order to carry into effect the legislative purpose,
State ex rel McKee v. McNeill, 58 Wash. 47, 107 Pac. 1028, 137 Am. St.
1038 (1910); Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Chehalis County
Bank, 65 Wash. 374, 118 Pac. 326 (1911); Lenagie v. Acme Stamp Works,
98 Wash. 34, 167 Pac. 60 (1917); Arbogast v. Linz, 180 Wash. 315, 39 P.
(2d) 615 (1935) ; yet, no property is exempt unless made expressly so by
statute. No assumed legislative policy can justify the courts in adding to
the statutory lists of exemptions or in extending them by implication. In re
Brown's Estate, 123 Cal. 399, 55 Pac. 1055 (1899); Bull v. Case, 165 N. Y.
578, 59 N. E. 301 (1901); see also 2 CoucH CYL. OF INSURANCE LAW (1929
ed.) 936.
The courts, with one exception, have held that there is no exemption
of property purchased with exempt proceeds of insurance policies. This
result has been reached under statutes exempting "all money, or other
benefits, charity, relief, or aid", Bank of Brimson v. Graham, 335 Mo.
1209, 76 S. W. (2d) 376; 96 A. L. R. 399 (1934); Pefly v. Reynolds, 115
Kan. 105, 222 Pac. 121 (1924); Bull v. Case, 165 N. Y. 578, 59 N. E. 301
(1901); "proceeds", J. S. Merrill Drug Co. v. Dixon, 131 Ky. 212, 115 S.
W. 179, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 118 (1909); and, "money received by, or payable,
to, a surviving wife or child". Ross v. Sinzser, 193 Minn. 407, 258 N. W.
582 (1935).
An exception to the holding of the above cases is found in Cook v.
Allee, 119 Iowa 226, 93 N. W. 93 (1903) where, under a statute exempting
"avails", it was held that the exemption extended to property purchased
with the insurance money. This decision was affirmed without discussion
in Booth v. Martin, 158 Iowa 434, 139 N. W. 888 (1913); and, now, the
result of Cook v. Allee, supra, is enacted in Sec. 4009 of the Iowa Code.
In the instant case it was said that the words "proceeds or avails"
made the Washington statute broader than that of any other state and
that apparently, the legislature intended a sweeping exemption. Statutory
differences in wording do afford a convenient basis for distinction, yet,
the presence of the word "avails" would not seem to be a valid means of
distinguishing those statutes of other states exempting "proceeds", "money
received by, etc.", "all money or other benefits, charity, relief, or aid."
WEBSTER's DICTIONARY makes no distinction in meaning between "avails"
and "proceeds" and, in fact, defines the former term by the use of the
latter. However, up to the point of holding that the stocks and bonds
purchased with the insurance money are exempt there is the authority
of Cook v. Allee, supra, and Booth v. Martin, supra, decided under a
statute substantially similar to that of Washington.
But in holding that the interest and dividends derived from such
exempt property remains exempt as "proceeds or avails of the insurance
money" the court goes further than even the Iowa cases and would seem
to be adding a new exemption to the statute. The liberal construction
given was not necessary to carry into effect the legislative purpose in
enacting the statute for that was amply taken care of by holding exempt
the property purchased with the insurance money. The case raises the
interesting question of whether or not income derived from the exempt
income would also be a "proceeds or avails" of the insurance policy. In
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the words of dissenting Judge Robinson, "It seems to me that, in taking
this last step, the majority departs from the realm of statutory interpretation and enter the field of judicial legislation, in that they, in effect add
to the words 'proceeds or avails of life insurance', used by the legislature,
these further words 'and the proceeds and avails thereof'."
R. A. H.
WiLLs-SPEIFIC on DEmONSTBATIVE LEGACY. Testatrix' will contained
a bequest of $5000 to M, to be paid "as and when received from my
former husband under and by virtue of that certain agreement made and
entered into on November 8, 1931, whereby my husband agreed to pay
me the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, said contract being in connection with divorce proceedings instituted by me against my former
husband." Held: This bequest is a specific legacy and the legatee is
entitled only to the amount actually received by the executors out of
the specified fund. In re Preston's Estate, 73 P. (2d) 369 (Ore. 1937).
The general rules concerning the nature and effect of specific legacies,
payable by or out of a designated fund only, and the nature and effect
of demonstrative legacies, payable out of a named fund first, and then
out of the general assets, are clear and well settled. However, their application to the facts of -this case was the occasion of some difficulty.
Courts favor the construction of ambiguous clauses as creating demonstrative legacies. In re Noon's Estate, 49 Ore. 286, 293, 88 Pao. 673 (1907).
Nevertheless, the question 'whether a legacy is specific, demonstrative
or general is essentially one of intent. Gildersleeve v. Lee, 100 Ore. 578,
198 Pac. 246 (1921); In re Doepke's Estate, 182 Wash. 556, 47 P. (2d) 1009
(1935).
The court, in the instant ease, considered the words "as and when
received" to be controlling, importing a contingency, without the occurrence of which the bequest must fail. The words -have never before been
so construed in this connection, the most nearly analogous case being
In re Blake's Estate, 157 Cal. 448, 108 Pac. 287 (1910), where it was
decided that the words "as and when" imported a contingency when a
bequest was to be paid upon the legatee's reaching a certain age. The
present case goes farther, however, when it interprets the same words
as creating a condition precedent to the existence of the fund itself.
It is -possible that the case unduly stresses the significance of the
The bequest itself provided that the
words "as and when received."
money was to be paid from the proceeds of the specified contract, and
the circumstances of the case show a definite intent that only that source
should -be charged with payment. It is, of course, true that no direction
out of what fund the legacy is to be raised will render the legacy specific,
unless the clear intent was to transfer all or part of the same identical
fund. 4 SCHOULER, WMLS, (6th ed. 1923) p. 2556. However, when that
intent does appear, the court has no choice but to declare the legacy
specific. In re Jepson's Estate, 181 Cal. 745, 186 Pac. 352 (1919). In the
case under discussion, it is submitted that the bequest can reasonably
be construed as disposing of the corpus of the fund itself. The words
"as and when" can fairly be said to relate to the time of payment only.
By what seems to be a strained construction, the court arrived at a
proper result; but it is suggested that a sounder basis for the decision
lies in recognizing that the bequest itself provided for a gift of the corpus
of the fund, to the extent of $5000, if that much should be received, as
H. B. S.
this alone would be sufficient to make the legacy specific.
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WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION -

BENEFICIAREs -

DEPENDENTS

OF

FEALE

WORKERS. Plaintiffs, children under the age of sixteen, having an ablebodied father, seek, through their father, to recover under the workman's
compensation act for the death of their mother. Held: They are entitled
to recover under REM. REV. STAT. § 7679 (a) (1), which provides for
compensation for a widow or invalid widower and children under sixteen
years of age of a deceased workman. Epley v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 191 Wash. 162, 70 P. (2d) 1032, 73 P. (2d) 521 (1937).
The statute, REM. REV. STAT. § 7673 provides that the act shall exclude
every other remedy for injuries falling within its scope. Peet v. Mills,
76 Wash. 437, 136 Pac. 685, Ann. Cas. 1915D 154, L. R. A. 1916A 358
(1913). On the strength of this provision, a party seeking relief under
the wrongful death act, REM. REV. STAT. §§ 183 and 183-1, was denied
recovery in Anthony v. National Fruit Canning Co., 185 Wash. 637, 56
P. (2d) 688 (1936). The court in that case also held that no right of
action was preserved under the factory act, WASH. LAWS 1905, chap. 84,
p. 164, since that act has been superseded by the workman's compensation act and the remedies here applicable under the factory act were
omitted from the superseding act. Now, basing their decision on Anthony
v. National Fruit Canning Co., supra, the court feels constrained to hold
that in spite of the statutory provision which declares that only children
having an invalid father may recover, the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment. They say now that, "the theory upon which they (the Anthonys)
were denied relief in their action for wrongful death was that their
remedy was to be found in the compensation act."
Apparently the court now feels bound by the maxim that "there can
be no wrong without a remedy." In view of the "spirit" of the workman's compensation act and a long line of Washington decisions to the
contrary, the maxim is hardly a sound rationalization. Speaking of an
instance where there is a similar lack of remedy, the case of Robinson
v. McHugh, 158 Wash. 157, 291 Pac. 330 (1930), holds that the legislature may abolish the remedy for wrongful death, since it was only a
statutory relief in the beginning. This holding was approved in Denning
v. Quist, 160 Wash. 681, 297 Pac. 145 (1931); and on rehearing, Denning
v. Quist, 172 Wash. 83, 19 P. (2d) 656 (1933). See also Mattson v. Dept.
of Labor and Industries, 176 Wash. 345, 29 P. (2d) 675 (1934); Long v.
Thompson, 177 Wash. 296, 31 P. (2d) 908 (1934). Similar results are
found in cases from other jurisdictions where the legislature has intended
to make the workman's compensation act exclusive of other remedies and
has failed to provide a particular remedy where one existed before.
Shanahan v. Monarch Engineering Co., 219 N. Y. 469, 114 N. E. 795
(1916); King v. Viscoloid Co., 219 Mass. 420, 106 N. E. 988, Ann. Cas.
1916D 1170 (1914).
In construing REM. REV. STAT. § 7679 (a) (1) as it did, the court
Ignored the policy previously approved by it in North Spokane Irrigation
Dist. v. Spokane County, 173 Wash. 281, 22 P. (2d) 990 (1933), wherein
it quoted from 2 LEwIS' SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (2 ed.
1904) p. 702, as follows: "When the meaning of a statute is clear, its
consequences, if evil, can only be avoided by a change of the law itself,
to be effected by the legislature, and not by judicial construction."
It is submitted that the effect of the decision is to read the word
invalid out of REM. REV. STAT. § 7679 (a) (1), thus materially enlarging
the class of those entitled to compensation and giving a remedy to the
child with an able-bodied father for the death of the mother, although
the legislature expressly failed to provide for such a remedy.
H. B. S.

